The role of formal models in theory building: an application to strategy theory. by Phelps, Bob
The role of formal models in theory building: an application to strategy theory 
Bob Phelps, Cranfield School of Management, UK. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A problem of the management field is that concepts are often vague and this breeds 
fragmented theories, each concentrating on different aspects of an underlying issue. 
This paper proposes the development of formal models in management to clarify and 
integrate the issues of the field. It illustrates this approach with a model of 
competitive advantage.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The foundation concepts of any field are important since they provide a shared basis 
to underpin research and allow results to be viewed cumulatively.  Unfortunately this 
is hardly the case in organization theory. Zammuto and Connolly (1984) consider 
organisational science on the other hand to be severely fragmented, presenting a serious 
obstacle to scientific growth; they evidence the low level of interconnection of ideas 
found in organisational textbooks. Similarly, Pfeffer (1997) states that it has a low level 
of paradigm development and notes that consensus seems almost to be avoided, while 
some researchers have found little consensus even about what the most important 
research issues should be. 
This paper starts from generally accepted concepts at the core of the notion of strategy 
and illustrates how a model of competitive advantage might be constructed around 
them. Some propositions found in strategy theories are considered in terms of a 
formal model. We show how strategy prescriptions can be evaluated by reference to 
formal models. 
 
FORMAL MODELS 
A model is a set of elements and a set of relations between them. In a formal model it 
is possible to deduce results (propositions) from the basic assumptions (elements and 
relations) of the model (Stegmuller 1976). Although the term model is widespread in 
organizational theory, many such ‘models’ are in practice no more than lists of 
factors. They lack the relations which would allow the deduction of propositions. 
Formal models provide both precision and deducible propositions. A sharp model 
lends itself to verification or disproof in a way that a set of fuzzy notions does not. 
Formal models which gain acceptance promote a standard set of factors thus assisting 
cross-case comparisons. In this way knowledge can be built by refining commonly 
held models.  
 
An objection to the use of formal models in social systems is that the concepts 
involved do not lend themselves to precision or definite relationships. To model is to 
simplify reality, and it may be argued that oversimplification will result owing to the 
complexity and consequent contingent effects within social systems. Yet in specific 
areas formal models have been adopted e.g. in theories of financial risk behaviour 
(Brigham and Gapenski, 1997), organizational ecology, punctuated organizational 
change and in decision making.  
 
STRATEGY 
The concept of strategy in the literature remains unclear. Hart & Banbury (1994) note 
that the literature contains a bewildering array of schools of strategy, while Foss 
(1996) characterises research in strategy as too pluralistic and in need of integration. 
Shenhav et al (1994) in a study of published articles report that only 20% provided a 
theoretical definition of the concepts used. Strategy therefore provides a good example 
of a fragmented field of organizational research. 
 
A proposition of the positioning school is that advantage is primarily a function of the 
firm’s environment and is due to an industry effect and a positioning effect (Porter 
1991). Competition arises from other firms with essentially similar resources entering 
the same market position.  
A proposition of the resource based school (Barney 1991) is that competitive 
advantage comes primarily from resources owned by the firm. Different authors have 
proposed different concepts of inimitable, advantage sustaining resources, including 
distinctive competencies , underlying capabilities, core competencies, internal 
capabilities, and absorptive capacity. Grant (1991) notes that there is no single 
integrating framework.  
The new institutionalism (Scott, 1995) provides the proposition that advantage 
accrues from the ways that the firm perceives its environment through the processes 
and structures which have acquired organizational or social validation.  
 
The basic assumptions which do appear to be widely shared by theories of 
competitive advantage can be summed up as follows: 
• Returns are a function of the fit between resources, position and the environment. 
• The environment is uncertain and changing 
• Competition means the erosion of returns to the firm. 
 
Based on these assumptions we develop a formal model of competitive advantage in 
terms of the long term returns to a firm. The model is used to investigate examples of 
propositions found in the strategy literature. These propositions, such as that 
resources can produce sustainable strategic advantage, are often stated as though they 
necessarily follow from the assumptions and arguments employed. Without the 
benefit of formal models it is difficult to evaluate whether these claims are true. The 
model is used to investigate whether such propositions follow from the assumptions. 
 
A FORMAL MODEL OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Competitive advantage is measured by long term returns. We model returns as 
resulting from the fit between  the content of the strategy (resources and position) and 
the state of the environment at a given time. For simplicity,  returns are evaluated at 
an infinite sequence of discrete time points (rather than continuously). At each time 
point the return depends on the strategy in place and the environment at that time. 
st  = { rt, pt}is the strategy content at time t, described by the chosen resources (r) and 
positioning of the firm (p). r describes the firm and includes physical resources, 
intellectual property, routines. p describes the market conditions for the firm and 
includes market growth, customer characteristics, market share, level of competition. 
et is the state of the environment at time t, including economic conditions, level of 
competition, competitor actions, regulatory actions, etc.  
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r, p and e are modelled in terms of  probability distributions. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that et depends only on the previous environment state et-1 and strategy 
choice st-1. 
 
The return due to the fit between strategy and environment is modelled by a function f 
depending only on s and e: f(s, e). We make only minimal assumptions about the 
structure of f in accordance with the assumptions commonly shared by strategy 
theories described above. 
If the environment becomes more uncertain or if the outcome of strategy 
implementation becomes more uncertain then this will make the returns more 
uncertain. This is modelled by making the variance of the return a monotonic function 
of both the variance of strategy and the variance of the environment: 
var (f) is monotonic increasing in var (s) and in var (e) 
Competition is modelled  by the erosion of returns over time if the firm maintains a 
fixed strategy. This represents the assumption that competitors will eat into the firm’s 
returns unless it takes active steps to prevent this. Hence if the firm sticks to the same 
strategy s over time, then denoting the nth use of the same strategy  s by f(n) 
Ef(n)(s, et) < Ef(s, et ) 
The efficiency of resource allocation is modelled by requiring  f to be monotonic in 
the cost of s, i.e. if  the firm becomes more efficient in resource usage  then returns 
increase.  
 
Following standard modelling practice, e.g. in the CAPM model (Brigham and 
Gapenski, 1997) the model discounts risky and future returns. The discount factor is 
a, 0<a<1. The discount factor a depends upon the uncertainty of returns expected in 
each period. That is, a depends on the variance of the distribution of f, a = g(var(f)), 
and the function g is monotonic decreasing in var(f). Since f is a function of s and e 
we write a(s,e). 
 
The total expected discounted return from following a series of strategy decisions s1 
,s2 , .... over an infinite time period where the environmental states are e1, e2 ,.... is  
Σt=1 at-1  Ef(st, et) 
where at-1 refers to the multiple of the discount factors for periods 2 to t (the discount 
factor for period 1 is always 1)and where E denotes the expected (average) value of 
the distribution f(s, e). 
The notion of implementation costs for strategies is modelled by switching costs. A 
new strategy can be implemented at any time. But this involves changing resources 
and positions. Such changes have associated costs (managerial, information, resource) 
associated with them payable immediately. 
c(st+1, st ) is the switching cost of changing to strategy st+1 at t+1 from strategy st at t. 
If the strategy remains unchanged then there is no switching cost: c = 0 if st = st+1. 
 
The strategic decision problem is then to maximise the total expected discounted 
value of the fit over time. The total expected value from t depends on the state at t: st-1 
and e t-1 . The maximised total expected discounted value (through choice of the 
optimal strategies { st}) over all future periods is denoted by V (st-1 , et-1). 
V (st-1 , et-1) = Max{ Σt=1 at-1  E[f(st, et) - c(st, st-1 )]} over { st } 
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DEDUCTIONS FROM THE MODEL 
This model is one representation of competitive advantage based on common 
assumptions derived from the literature. The model developed here is intended as an 
illustration of the power of formal models to clarify issues in a well-trodden and much 
debated area. The model is used to examine whether common strategy prescriptions 
do in fact follow from the assumptions as embedded in the model.  
 
1) Can we find a strategy for sustainable advantage?   
Some strategy theories imply that resources or positions can be found which confer 
lasting competitive advantage. This means that a fixed (stable) strategy continues to 
be optimal. Can a stable strategy be optimal? 
Consider a stable strategy st = s*, for all t. 
The expected return from the optimal strategy is 
 Max{ Σt=1 at-1  E[f(st, et ) - c(st, st-1 )]} over { st } 
This is greater than or equal to the return from any other strategy, in particular  to the 
return from putting st = s* for all t: 
Σt=1 at-1  E[f(s*, et ) - c(s*, s* )] 
And from competitive erosion this is strictly greater than 
Σt=1 at-1  E[f(t)(s*, et ) - c(s*, s* )] 
which is the expected return from using the stable strategy s*.  
So the proposition that a stable strategy can be found which gives lasting advantage is 
not consistent with the assumptions of the model.  
 
2) The hare or the tortoise: does speedy strategy win?  
Another proposition we consider is that speedier decisions give more advantage 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). A more reactive firm is able to make and implement decisions 
more quickly. In terms of the model this can be formalised as the ability to take 
decisions and change strategy more frequently. Does this ability increase competitive 
advantage by adding to the firm’s returns?  
Consider a new decision process which allows an extra decision to be made at some 
point (t+dt) between t and t+1. The value of the return from t to t+1 will now be split 
into two parts: return at t over a period of length dt plus return at t+dt over the 
remaining period of length 1-dt. . Define V t(st-1)  as the optimal value from t onward 
if st-1 was chosen at t-1, when an extra decision point is introduced at t + dt. Define U 
t(st-1)  as the optimal value from t onward if  no change in strategy is made at t+dt. 
Define Ut+dt(st , et) = (1-dt)Ef(st,  et+dt ) + a(st)Vt+1 (st ,  et+dt) 
and Vt+dt(st , et) = Max s {(1-dt)Ef(s,  et+dt ) - c(s,  st)  + a(s)Vt+1(s, et+dt) } 
i.e. the optimal value from t+dt onward if strategy st  (as before, the optimal choice at t 
if choices are allowed only at unit time intervals) which was chosen at t is kept (U) or 
allowed to change (V) at t+dt. 
We consider the effect of a rapidly changing environment. The environment might 
change without affecting the choice of strategy. In this case there is no extra return 
from being able to react at intermediate decision points.  However, the environment 
might change in a way which does affect choice of strategy. This means that: 
V t+dt(st , et) > Ut+dt(st , et) for some dt, 0<dt<1. 
So V t(st-1 , et-1) = Max s  {dtEf(s, et) - c(s,  st-1) + V t+dt(s , et)} >  dtEf(st, et) - c(st,  st-1) + 
U t+dt(st , et) 
= U t(st-1) 
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So under conditions of rapid change the model shows that total return is increased by 
allowing an additional decision point, that is by rapid adaptation of strategy. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The introduction of formal models into management theory has several advantages.  
First it forces precision in the use of management concepts. Verbal concepts are often 
shrouded in ambiguity. In order to be incorporated in a formal model they must be 
stated in such a way that their relations to other elements of the model is clear. 
Second, the web of interconnected assumptions which typically comprise 
management theories are mapped into one consistent framework by the model. The 
model illustrates how starting from a sparse set of generally agreed assumptions more 
complex propositions about strategic behaviour can be deduced from the model and 
how the claims of certain theories can be tested against the model.  
Third, a formal model provides guidance in analysing complex situations.  Without a 
formal model researchers are thrown back on their own selection of concepts and 
relationships and this leads to fragmentation of the field.  Numerous contingent 
relationships may be separately investigated using different tools, without the 
possibility of integrating their results. A model allows research to concentrate on the 
important elements and relations in the data.  
It is to be hoped that formal models will play a larger role in the future development 
of organizational theory. 
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